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/conomists, policymakers, and even
the general public frequently make the
mistaken assumption that the Federal
Reserve System can effect predictable
changes in real output simply by manip-
ulating the short-term money supply.
While it is certainly true that a positive
correlation exists between nominal
money and real output (see figure 1), the
jury is still out on whether this correla-
tion indicates that changes in money
cause changes in output.
Specifically, it is unproven whether
short-run increases in money above
trend cause increases in real output
above its trend level. And perhaps most
important, even if money does affect
output in the short term, it is not clear
how this relationship could be used by
the Federal Reserve to enhance social
welfare.
This Economic Commentary will ex-
plore two reasons why the perception
that money causes output has main-
tained its grip. First, as a general rule,
correlation is frequently taken to imply
causality — often an incorrect assump-
tion. As figure 1 demonstrates, changes
in money do precede changes in out-
put, inevitably causing some to con-
clude a causal relationship. However,
simple temporal ordering does not con-
cretely indicate causality. Even though
changes in nominal money precede
changes in output, that observation in
and of itself is not sufficient evidence to
warrant any particular conclusion about
the direction of causality between
money and output. Second, a number of
early macroeconomic models were con-
structed using the assumption that short-
term deviations in money would cause
changes in output, a view that coincided
with the conventional wisdom of econo-
mists and policymakers.We will offer
an alternative explanation for the posi-
tive correlation between money and out-
put. It argues that although we cannot
reject the notion that short-run fluctua-
tions in money do not result in short-
term fluctuations in output, we also can-
not reject the opposite hypothesis that
changes in real output, or the expecta-
tions of future output, cause changes in
money.
After exploring the reasons for this
misperception about money and out-
put, this Commentary also looks at the
policy consequences resulting from it.
In particular, since it cannot be known
with certainty whether the Federal
Reserve has control over real output,
the wisdom of conducting policy as if
it does must be questioned. We con-
clude by suggesting an alternative
policy based on rules.
• Correlation Does Not Equal
Causality
Does the Federal Reserve cause Christ-
mas? A silly concept, perhaps, but con-
sider the evidence.
As figure 2 illustrates, fourth-quarter
changes in the money supply are posi-
tively correlated with fourth-quarter
changes in output. Without further in-
The casual observer, noting that
money and output are frequently cor-
related, might assume that there is a
causal relationship between the two.
A closer look at the evidence suggests
otherwise.
formation, it is not possible to tell
whether increases in money cause the
corresponding increases in output, or
whether increases in output cause the
corresponding increase in money, or
whether some third, unspecified vari-
able causes increases in both. Knowing
only the positive correlation between
the two, an uninformed observer might
easily conclude that the Federal Re-
serve System indeed causes Christmas!
The direction of causality is fairly easy
to identify in this particular case. Out-
put rises in the fourth quarter because
of increased consumer spending, and
the Federal Reserve boosts the money
supply to accommodate the increased
spending. However, this does not com-
pletely explain the causal relationship
between money and output, because
the two are correlated at times other
than Christmas as well.
And even though figure 1 clearly indi-
cates that changes in money precede
changes in output, can we conclude
from this that changes in money
"cause" changes in output? Unfortu-
nately, inferences about the direction of
ISSN 0428-1276causality between two variables cannot
be based on their temporal ordering.
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To illustrate the problems inherent in in-
ferring causality from mere temporal or-
dering, consider the case of the relation-
ship between the act of carrying an
umbrella and the potential for rain. In
other words, does the act of carrying an
umbrella increase the probability of
rain, or does the possibility of rain
cause an individual to carry an umbrel-
la? If an observer were to rely only on
the temporal ordering of umbrella-carry-
ing and rainfall, he or she could easily
assume, in the absence of any other
data, that the act of carrying an umbrel-
la causes rain to occur. Obviously,
people who pay attention to weather
forecasts will carry an umbrella when
precipitation is predicted, thus negating
the earlier conclusion of a temporal
relationship indicating causality.
The relationship between money and
real output can be subject to the same
misperception. Again referring to the
umbrella/rain relationship, it is entirely
possible that some additional, un-
known variable or variables, such as
the expectation that future output is
going to increase, cause money to in-
crease before real output. Thus, the
Federal Reserve reacts to the known
trend for increased consumer spending,
and for corresponding increases in out-
put, by providing extra cash reserves
for the holiday season.
• The Real Business Cycle
Explanation
Yet another basis for the misperception
about the money/output relationship,
and for its persistence, is the fact that
most undergraduate textbook macro-
economic models assume that the
Federal Reserve controls real output.
Traditional Keynesian and monetarist
models assume some type of rigidity,
such as sticky nominal wages, in order
to generate the result that the Federal
Reserve can control output by changing
money supply. Other models emphasize
the difference between the effects of an-
ticipated and unanticipated changes in
the money supply. If people in the
economy behave rationally, then only un-
FIGURE1 REAL GNP AND M2
Percent deviations
2.01
1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988
NOTE: Sample period is from 1959:1Q to 1988:IVQ.
SOURCES: Data Resources, Inc., and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
anticipated changes in the supply of
money can affect real output.
While these models adequately explain
certain facts, some econometric studies
have found that little of the variation in
real output can be accounted for by
variations in nominal money. The
failure of money to account for a large
portion of business-cycle fluctuations
has prompted economists to consider
alternative explanations of both the
business cycle and the correlation be-
tween real money and output. One
such alternative explanation is com-
monly referred to as the real business
cycle explanation.
The real business cycle explanation of
cyclical fluctuations differs from pre-
vious models in that it assumes
economic fluctuations to be generated
by changes such as technological in-
novations or other economic "shocks"
—positive or negative—and not by
money. These innovations or shocks
may be productivity-enhancing, such
as the invention and subsequent prolif-
eration of personal computers, or
productivity-diminishing, as in the case
of an increase in the price of raw
materials (oil, for example).
Unlike previous models of the business
cycle, the success of real business cycle
models rests on their ability to generate
artificial data to match observed co-
movements among output, investment,
consumption, and employment.
If these models explain cyclical fluctua-
tions without relying on money, then
how do they explain the correlation be-
tween real output and money? Recall
that correlation and causality are two
different concepts. Although these mod-
els assign no causal role to money, they
do yield predictions for the correlation
between money and output. In particu-
lar, real business cycle theory predicts
that the positive correlation between
money and output is due to reverse
causality. In other words, nominal
money and real output are positively
correlated because changes in real out-
put cause changes in nominal money.
Suppose, for example, that scientists
discover a material that is super-
conductive at room temperature. Such
a discovery would be considered a
positive technological shock that
would, in the long run, lead to higher
potential real output in the economy.
The immediate effect, however, would
be an increase in the demand forFIGURE 2 REAL GNP AND MONETARY BASE
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money as firms attempted to finance
new investment projects and as con-
sumers, anticipating a permanent in-
crease in income, spent more money.
As the demand for money increases,
the banking sector supplies a larger
quantity of money in the form of check-
ing and savings accounts. We should
therefore observe a positive correlation
between real output and broader
measures of money such as Ml and
M2, with changes in money preceding
the changes in output. The Federal
Reserve would be inclined to accom-
modate the increased demand for
money as well. If this was the case,
then we would also observe a positive
correlation between the monetary base
and real output.
The correlations between real output
and different measures of money are
qualitatively consistent with real busi-
ness cycle theory. These correlations in-
dicate that the bulk of the relationship
between money and real output can be
found within the components of money
determined by the banking sector. They
also indicate that monetary changes
occur prior to changes in real output.
In particular, the correlation between
the monetary base and real output is
small relative to the correlation be-
tween real output and Ml or M2. The
contemporaneous correlation between
real output and Ml is 0.59, and the cor-
relation between real output and M2
(lagged two quarters) is .68.
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Few economists disagree with the
hypothesis that at least some of the cor-
relation between real output and money
is due to reverse causality. The point of
disagreement centers on whether this is
the only link between short-term
money fluctuations and output. While
these correlations do not imply reverse
causality, they are at least consistent
with it. The data do not reject the pos-
sibility that changes in real output can
either partially or totally explain move-
ments in nominal money.
• Policy Implications
The popular media continuously report
that the Federal Reserve is either tight-
ening or loosening the money supply in
order to inhibit or stimulate the growth
rate of real output. The general public
and policymakers alike act as if short-
run money can, and therefore should, be
used to control output. As we have
shown, there is no conclusive evidence
to suggest that the Federal Reserve has
any real ability to control real output
simply by manipulating the money
supply.
Given our ignorance about the money-
output relationship, how should the
Federal Reserve conduct policy? At
first glance, it would seem that the ef-
fects of current policy would be benign
if short-term fluctuations in money do
not cause output. However, we argue
that acting as if monetary policy affects
output is at worst benign and may ac-
tually be harmful. And most would
agree that policy should, first and
foremost, do no harm, to borrow the
physician's maxim.
Even if money does affect real output
through "Keynesian channels" such as
nominal wage contracts, it is unclear
whether using monetary policy to stabi-
lize output would actually increase out-
put. Similarly, a neoclassical model
by Lucas (1977) predicts that output
changes induced by monetary policy
are actually welfare-reducing. Policies
that lead to increased variability of
money also lead to price instability,
and are thus ultimately detrimental to
social welfare.
There is also some evidence indicating
that countries with the highest growth
rates of money actually have lower
growth rates of real output. The
theoretical explanation for this is that
higher inflation, typically associated
with higher money growth, is in reality
a tax on real money balances. Like any
other tax, this particular one lowers out-
put below its potential level. Higher
growth rates of money are also usually
accompanied by higher variability of
money growth, adding an additional ele-
ment of distortion to the economic pic-
ture. The uncertainty generated by
changes in this tax lowers output even
further.
Although a pure real business cycle
model predicts that money is complete-
ly neutral, it is quite possible that the
true explanation of why output has
recurrent fluctuations will require both
Keynesian and real business cycleelements. Some movements in real
output — deviations from trend —
may be optimal, as described by real
business cycle theorists, and some may
be due to market failures, as described
by Keynesians. At the present time,
however, it is impossible to distinguish
between these two types of cyclical
fluctuations.
Even if money can be used to control
output, how would the choice be made
between which shocks to offset and
which to leave alone? Even in the most
optimistic scenario, where the choice
to act is very clear, the gain from doing
so is reputedly small. Lucas (1988)
points out that the welfare gains made
by smoothing business cycle fluctua-
tions are small and are dwarfed by the
potential gains from increasing long-
run growth.
Given this, and the need for the money
supply to be as predictable as possible
to prevent output changes that are clear-
ly welfare-reducing, we believe that it
would be better for the Federal Reserve
to commit to a monetary policy rule.
One such rule would be for the Federal
Reserve to commit to a long-run goal
such as price stability. However, if
such a long-run policy is intended to
reduce uncertainty, it should specify in
advance a complete target path for a
particular price index. Then people
could see how the Federal Reserve
intended to lower the current rate of in-
flation and how it would respond to fu-
ture deviations of the price level from
the announced path.
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